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As forensic tests for deoxyribonucleic acid 
("DNA") become more precise and 
more prevalent, the available de-
fenses a defendant might have to 
counter the DNA acid evidence 
become more limited. In Williams 
v. State, 342 Md. 724, 679 A.2d 
1106 (1996), the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland held that when the 
polymerase chain reaction test is 
used on DNA evidence, defense 
counsel must have the opportunity 
to cross-examine technicians con-
cerning the possibility of labora-
tory contamination. In Williams, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
reinforced the principle that vigor-
ous cross-examination of expert 
witnesses should be allowed to 
assist the jury in determining how 
much weight to give to particular 
evidence. 
When Jose Trias and his wife, 
Julie Gilbert, both successful attor-
neys, failed to appear at their of-
fices on May 16, 1994, their co-
workers became concerned. After 
several unsuccessful attempts to 
reach the couple at their weekend 
home in Annapolis, Gilbert's sec-
retary contacted RickyCole, who 
had a key to the house. Upon ar-
riving at the couple's home, Cole 
found a note taped to the door 
stating, "ON VACATION!! BE 
BACK 20 MAY." Cole also found 
Gilbert's Acura Legend missing. 
When he searched the house, Cole 
found Trias and Gilbert lying on 
their bed face down, both fatally 
shot in the head. Although there 
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was no evidence of a break-in, the 
couple's automatic teller machine 
("ATM") cards and jewelry were 
missing. 
During the crime scene investi-
gation, police found epithelial 
cells, consistent with those found 
inside of a human's mouth, on a 
drinking glass in the kitchen. The 
epithelial cells were sent to 
Cellmark Diagnostics, Inc. for 
DNA testing. The biologist at 
Cellmark tested the cells using a 
process called polymerase chain 
reaction ("PCR") and excluded the 
victims as the source of the DNA. 
The cells later matched DNA sam-
ples taken from the defendant. 
Scotland Eugene Williams, the 
defendant, was arrested three days 
after the bodies were found. Secu-
rity cameras at A TM machines had 
photographed Williams attempting 
to withdraw money using the ATM 
cards at several locations. The 
cameras also photographed 
Williams in an Acura Legend 
which resembled the decedent's 
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car. 
When arrested, Williams had 
over $2,000 in cash and was carry-
ing a bag containing a crow bar, a 
can of mace, and a gold watch, 
later identified as belonging to 
Gilbert. A search of the defen-
dant's home revealed handcuffs, 
bloodstained clothing, and brown 
cotton gloves made offibers iden-
tical to fibers found on the tape of 
the "ON VACATION" sign. 
Before trial, defense counsel 
made a motion to exclude the PCR 
test results on the ground that PCR 
testing has not attained general 
acceptance in the scientific com-
munity. After a two day hearing 
on the motion, the trial judge con-
cluded that PCR is generally ac-
cepted as being reliable and denied 
the motion. 
The jury convicted Williams of 
two counts of first degree murder, 
multiple counts of robbery with a 
deadly weapon, theft, burglary, 
and use of a handgun in the com-
mission of a violent crime. At the 
capital sentencing hearing, Judge 
Lerner sentenced Williams to 
death. Pursuant to Section 414, 
Article 27 of the Annotated Code 
of Maryland, which provides auto-
matic review of death sentences, 
the Court of Appeals heard the 
appeal. The court reversed 
Williams' murder convictions and 
remanded the case for a new trial. 
The burglary conviction was re-
versed based on the insufficiency 
of the evidence. Although the 
Williams court addressed more 
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 57 
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than eight separate issues, only 
two evidentiary rulings applied to 
the DNA evidence. 
First, the court of appeals re-
viewed the trial court's decision to 
admit the PCR test results. The 
court began its analysis by review-
ing Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 
673 A.2d 221 (1996). Williams at 
751, 679 A.2d at 1120. In 
Armstead, the court found that 
there are two ways in which courts 
may determine whether scientific 
evidence is admissible: (1) if per-
mitted by statute; or (2) in the ab-
sence of a statute, if the proponent 
can show that the evidence is gen-
erally accepted in the scientific 
community. Jd. at 750, 679 A.2d 
at 1120. To determine whether the 
evidence was permitted by statute, 
the Williams court looked to 
Maryland's Annotated Code which 
states that restriction fragment 
length polymorphism ("RFLP") 
testing is admissible but does not 
address PCR testing. Id. at 752, 
679 A.2d at 1121 (citing MD. ANN. 
CODE., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-
915 (1995)). 
Since PCR testing was not 
addressed by statute, the court then 
discussed whether PCR testing 
was generally accepted by the rele-
vant scientific community. Id at 
752,679 A.2d at 1120. Generally, 
courts apply the Frye-Reed test to 
establish the standard for general 
acceptance. Jd. at 752,679 A.2d at 
1121 (citing Frye v. United States, 
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); 
Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 
A.2d 364 (1978)). The Williams 
court, however, did not decide 
whether the PCR method of DNA 
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testing was admissible under the 
Frye-Reed test and noted that such 
a determination was not necessary 
for resolution of the case at bar. 
Id. Instead, the court stated that 
"given the rapidly developing sci-
entific data on the reliability of the 
PCR method of DNA testing, we 
believe it might be premature to 
pass on the question based on the 
record from the initial hearing 
which is more than a year old." Id. 
Next, the court of appeals ad-
dressed whether the trial court 
erred in restricting defense coun-
sel's attempts to cross-examine the 
lab technician about the frequency 
of errors and contamination which 
occurs during PCR testing. Id. at 
744, 679 A.2d at 1116. At trial, 
the State called Melissa Weber, the 
senior molecular biologist who 
performed the PCR test at 
Cellmark. Weber testified that the 
PCR test was used instead of the 
more established RFLP test be-
cause PCR testing can be done on 
smaller samples. Id. at 744, 679 
A.2d at 1117. She also stated that 
RFLP testing can provide a "very 
specific match between two sam-
ples" Id. In contrast, PCR testing 
can only "narrow down a potential 
number of donors in one group." 
Id. 
Weber testified that Cellmark 
subjects its technicians to blind 
proficiency tests from independent 
agencies to determine whether the 
technicians are performing the 
tests using proper procedures. Id. 
at 746, 679 A.2d at 1118. 
Cellmark technicians made no 
errors in any of the PCR pro-
ficiency tests. During cross-
examination, defense counsel 
asked Weber if there had been 
incidents of any contamination 
separate from the proficiency tests. 
Weber testified that there had been 
at least one occasion in which she 
had contaminated a sample. When 
the defense questioned Weber if 
she knew of incidents of con-
tamination by other technicians in 
Cellmark, the State objected. 
After a bench conference, the trial 
judge sustained the objection. Id. 
at 749, 679 A.2d at 1119. 
The State contended that the 
issue of whether other technicians 
had contaminated samples was 
irrelevant because Weber was the 
only technician who handled the 
sample in this case. The defense 
argued that through the use of this 
line of questioning, the jury would 
be able to understand how suscep-
tible PCR tests are to contamina-
tion. The court held that the trial 
court's refusal "to allow [defense 
counsel] to question Weber about 
general problems of contamination 
of PCR samples at Cell mark de-
prived Williams of the full oppor-
tunity to cast doubt on the reliabil-
ity of the DNA evidence." Id. at 
754, 679 A.2d at 1122. The jury 
was not given sufficient informa-
tion upon which to determine how 
much weight to give to the PCR 
test results. Id. at 751, 679 A.2d 
1120. This holding was consistent 
with the Armstead ruling. 
Williams and its predecessor 
Armstead effectively demonstrate 
the difficulties encountered when 
criminal prosecutions rely heavily 
on forensic evidence, particularly 
DNA testing. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland in Williams 
left open the issue of whether peR 
testing will be admissible under 
the Frye-Reed test. With the in-
creased use of DNA testing and 
medical expertise in criminal trials, 
it is apparent that the trial courts 
will need to decide which tests are 
admissible and which are not. In 
light of the Williams decision, 
courts will allow defense attorneys 
as much latitude as possible in 
cross-examination of expert DNA 
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technicians. Both prosecution and 
defense attorneys, however, need 
to heighten their awareness of the 
evidentiary issues surrounding the 
various DNA tests and their sus-
ceptibility to contamination. 
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 59 
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